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Between Military Non-Alignment 
and Integration 
Finland and Sweden in Search of a New Security Strategy 
Tobias Etzold and Christian Opitz 
Alarmed by the Ukraine crisis and Russia’s military activity in the Baltic Sea region, 
Finland and Sweden are currently engaged in an intensive debate about their national 
security. Faced with a changing threat scenario, there is growing doubt in both coun-
tries about their current defence capabilities. Questions are also being asked about 
the security policy course pursued since the end of the Cold War, with calls for higher 
military spending and NATO accession being the reflex response. However, correspond-
ing initiatives would need to be embedded in a comprehensive and coherent security 
and defence strategy. Various options for cooperation exist at bilateral, regional and 
European level and could comprise key elements of this strategy. 
 
The principle of military non-alignment is 
firmly embedded in Sweden’s and Finland’s 
security culture. Nonetheless, since the end 
of the Cold War, the two countries’ security 
policy has been strongly oriented towards 
participation in international crisis missions 
under EU and NATO command. As both 
countries are also increasingly integrated 
in NATO’s cooperation structures and sup-
port the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP), this supposed military 
non-alignment is looking increasingly doubt-
ful. At the same time, the two countries’ 
national defence capabilities have been 
substantially reduced, resulting in major 
deficits in some areas. In view of the grow-
ing tensions with Russia, the governments 
are prepared to make additional resources 
available for national defence, but their 
adherence to formal military non-align-
ment currently remains unbroken. In both 
countries, however, the debate about pos-
sible accession to NATO has recently 
gathered momentum. 
In Sweden, the future security policy 
course formed part of the cross-party agree-
ment which ended the government crisis 
in December 2014. Security policy is also 
likely to play a role in the context of the 
Finnish parliamentary elections on 19 April 
2015. However, the parties’ positions on 
NATO vary widely in both countries, and 
in Sweden, the public is clearly divided on 
this issue as well. 
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The debate in Finland 
The wars against the Soviet Union in the 
20th century have left their mark on Fin-
land’s security policy. In particular, the fact 
that Finland’s allies changed several times 
during the Second World War has nurtured 
a deep-seated belief that the country ulti-
mately has no option but to take sole respon-
sibility for its own security. This perception 
is still relevant today. This is partly due 
to Finland’s specific geostrategic position 
close to the Kola Peninsula, used by Russia 
as a key military base. 
Finland has fairly large defence capaci-
ties. A key element is general conscription, 
which still enjoys considerable public sup-
port. Nonetheless, the military has under-
gone painful restructuring in recent years: 
for example, the number of active reserve 
troops has been cut from 350,000 in 2012 
to 230,000 today, and although Finland still 
ranks among the top one-third in Europe 
with its defence budget, amounting to 
around 1.3 per cent of gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), spending on military equipment 
has halved since 1990. A cross-party parlia-
mentary report recently warned that with-
out additional resources, the military will 
only be able to carry out its tasks “for a few 
more years”. 
While there is a cross-party consensus 
in favour of increasing defence spending, 
the government is divided on the issue of 
NATO. Prime Minister Alexander Stubb 
(from the conservative National Coalition 
Party) and Defence Minister Carl Haglund 
(from the liberal Swedish People’s Party) 
openly support NATO membership as the 
logical extension of pro-Western integra-
tion. By contrast, Foreign Minister Erkki 
Tuomioja, a Social Democrat, is keen to 
avoid putting any extra strain on the coun-
try’s close relations with Russia. The liberal 
Centre Party, currently in opposition and in 
the lead in the pre-election opinion polls, 
takes a similar view. 
President Sauli Niinistö, the commander-
in-chief of the Finnish armed forces, is also 
cautious. He has already announced that ac-
cession to NATO would only be possible after 
a referendum. The Finnish people are still 
clearly opposed to membership: in the latest 
surveys in January 2015, only 25 per cent of 
Finns voiced support for such a move. 
The debate in Sweden 
In Sweden, Russia’s recent conduct has 
awakened unpleasant memories of the Cold 
War. Russian combat aircraft have repeated-
ly entered Swedish airspace, and there is a 
suspicion that in October 2014, a Russian 
submarine entered Swedish waters. Accord-
ing to Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, 
the Swedish people are genuinely fearful of 
Russia once more. 
Against this background, Swedish secu-
rity policy is likely to prioritise national 
defence in future, and there is a desire to 
reduce Sweden’s involvement in military 
operations overseas. All the political parties 
see a need to increase investment in the 
military in order to improve its operational 
capability. The defence budget is expected 
to increase by 3 per cent in 2015. Current 
spending amounts to around 1.2 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP). In operational 
terms, troop numbers on the Baltic island 
of Gotland – which was already strategical-
ly significant during the Cold War – have 
been increased. The reintroduction of gen-
eral conscription, which was only abolished 
in 2010, is also being considered. 
However, NATO accession is rejected by 
the Social Democratic/Green minority coali-
tion government, in office since October 
2014. By contrast, the four centre-right oppo-
sition parties are in favour of at least look-
ing at precisely what the criteria for mem-
bership might be. In order to avert the risk 
of snap elections, both camps signed the 
“December Agreement” and pledged to 
cooperate in various policy areas, including 
defence. However, political differences over 
the NATO issue are obstructing this co-
operation. 
Meanwhile, popular support for acces-
sion is growing. A survey conducted in 
October 2014 revealed, for the first time, a 
relative majority – 37 per cent – in favour 
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of membership; by January 2015, this had 
already climbed to 47 per cent. The findings 
are inconsistent, however: another survey 
conducted at the same time produced a 
figure of just 33 per cent in support of mem-
bership. 
Options for cooperation 
Current developments are changing Fin-
land’s and Sweden’s threat analyses and 
security policy interests. There is a growing 
recognition that in a crisis, their national 
defence capabilities would not be sufficient 
on their own. If the two countries maintain 
their adherence to military non-alignment, 
at least for the time being, this will inevi-
tably raise the question of alternative op-
tions for security cooperation. 
In recent years, both countries have 
progressively moved closer to NATO, and 
the expansion of this cooperation is now 
gaining new topicality. Sweden and Finland 
are already regarded as close allies and very 
active non-members. A strong message was 
sent by the signing of Host Nation Support 
Agreements, after long preparations, during 
the NATO Summit in Wales on 5 September 
2014. These agreements enable the two 
countries to benefit from NATO’s support 
in crisis situations. The Summit also estab-
lished the Partnership Interoperability 
Initiative. Sweden and Finland are among 
the small number of candidates for the third 
and final stage of this Initiative, known as 
the Enhanced Opportunities Program (EOP), 
which aims to increase interoperability in 
partners’ contributions to NATO operations 
and exercises, thereby further intensifying 
military cooperation and political dialogue. 
While NATO itself is interested in more 
intensive cooperation with Sweden and 
Finland, some members – especially the 
Baltic states – fear that the principle of col-
lective self-defence under Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty will be weakened 
and ultimately undermined if the Alliance 
increasingly involves non-members. Sweden 
and Finland should therefore not overtax 
the partnership, which is based on the good 
will of the NATO members, but also build 
up their national defence capacities on their 
own initiative and intensify other forms of 
cooperation. 
A further option for Finland and Sweden 
lies in the expansion of the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Both 
countries support the current CSDP, not 
only with disproportionately large person-
nel contributions. They are actively com-
mitted to deepened military integration 
in the long term too, for example through 
their participation in the EU’s Nordic Battle 
Group, a seven country-strong regional 
contribution to the EU’s crisis management 
capability. The Battle Group has been placed 
under Swedish command – for the third 
time – for the first six months of 2015. 
The EU’s main significance for Finland 
and Sweden lies in its status as a security 
community in the making. Both countries 
are calling for the mutual assistance clause 
of the Treaty of Lisbon to be implemented 
and progressively developed. At present, 
however, this does not include a guarantee 
of collective security, as the majority of EU 
members give clear priority to NATO. EU 
military integration is currently stagnating 
and is therefore only likely to increase Finn-
ish and Swedish defence capabilities to a 
minimal extent for the time being. 
Meanwhile, Sweden and Finland are 
moving closer in their bilateral military rela-
tions. In May 2014, they signed an Action 
Plan for Deepened Defence Cooperation, and 
in line with its provisions, the two coun-
tries’ armed forces delivered a joint final 
report at the end of February 2015, identi-
fying feasible cooperation areas and pro-
posing specific measures for their imple-
mentation. The initiative is motivated by a 
drive towards more efficiency, arising from 
budgetary constraints in both countries. 
But there is also a political logic behind the 
cooperation between these two countries, as 
the only non-NATO members in Northern 
Europe. 
At present, bilateral cooperation is based 
on ad hoc pragmatism and is geared solely 
towards peace time. Existing cooperative 
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activities, such as joint naval exercises, are 
being scaled up, but a unifying vision is still 
lacking. This approach is easy to “sell” at the 
domestic level and can certainly generate 
intermittent synergy effects. In practice, 
however, it does little to enhance the two 
countries’ defence capabilities. A bilateral 
defence alliance would have a far greater 
impact. Both sides would benefit from close 
integration of their national defence poli-
cies, even if this meant having to commit to 
a high level of interdependency. The armed 
forces themselves are calling indirectly for 
the cooperation to be expanded to conflict 
and crisis scenarios. The two Defence Minis-
ters have not publicly ruled out this form 
of alliance, although it is likely to remain 
unrealistic in the medium term due to on-
going scepticism on the part of most politi-
cians in both countries. 
In 2009, the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO) was established as a frame-
work for the continuation and expansion 
of security cooperation. Its members are 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and 
Sweden. The aim of this particular format 
is to identify efficient joint solutions to 
security-related problems and create syner-
gies between the five countries. NORDEFCO’s 
areas of cooperation include strategic devel-
opment; human resources and education; 
training and exercises; and joint opera-
tions. The cooperation is not guided by 
grand visions and high expectations, but 
by pragmatic needs at a basic functional 
level. The Baltic countries have also been 
involved in NORDEFCO projects since 2011. 
Nordic-Baltic security cooperation was 
deepened and widened in autumn 2014. 
Overall, military cooperation at the 
Nordic/Nordic-Baltic level is still a work in 
progress and has largely symbolic value at 
present. The regional approach is a good 
example of the “pooling and sharing” of 
military capabilities at the EU and NATO 
level. Due to the lack of military integra-
tion, however, it is too weak to facilitate 
stand-alone solutions to security challenges 
in the short to medium term. 
Durable security in 
Northern Europe 
NATO membership for Finland and Sweden 
is an unlikely scenario at present. In both 
countries, such a step would require a 
political consensus, a formal review of its 
implications, and a referendum, all of 
which would involve lengthy lead-in times. 
Each of the alternatives – cooperation with 
NATO or the CSDP, or bilateral or regional 
cooperation – seems inadequate in its own. 
Their beneficial elements, however, have 
the potential to be mutually reinforcing, 
provided that overlaps are avoided at the 
same time. NORDEFCO, for example, can 
contribute to defence integration in Europe, 
as the two processes are interdependent 
and evolve through interaction. Nordic-
Baltic cooperation, for its part, is a good 
example of close interaction between mem-
bers and non-members in the NATO con-
text. The same applies to deepened bilateral 
military cooperation between Sweden and 
Denmark, agreed in March 2015. In that 
sense, existing cooperation arrangements 
should be intensified, with “joined-up” 
thinking across the various options and in-
tegration of their various elements into a 
coherent overarching security and defence 
strategy. Such a strategy has the potential 
to enhance durable security in Northern 
Europe – and that will benefit Germany 
as well. 
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